Recent Decisions by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 1 Article 7 
1951 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Decisions, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 98 (1951). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol20/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
INSURANCE-MORTGAGES-STANDARD MORTGAGEE CLAUSE IN FIRE INsURANcE
PoLIc.-Plaintiff was the mortgagee of a building covered by a standard fire insur-
ance policy, taken out by the mortgagor, containing the New York standard mortgagee
clause. Following a fire which resulted in smoke and water damage to the mortgaged
premises, the mortgagor and insurer, failing to agree as to the amount of loss, ap-
pointed appraisers to fix the value of the building and the amount of loss in accordance
with the terms of the policy. The plaintiff-mortgagee had no notice of and did not
participate in the appraisal, and refused tender of the amount so fixed. Plaintiff sued
the insurer to recover the amount which plaintiff claimed was due, and on a directed
verdict received judgment in the same amount as fixed. by the prior appraisal, which
judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. Upon appeal to the
Court of Appeals, held, three judges dissenting, judgment reversed and new trial
ordered, on the ground that under the standard mortgagee clause as incorporated into
the New York standard fire insurance policy, plaintiff-mortgagee was not bound by
the appraisal in which it did not participate. Syracuse Savings Bank v. Yorkshire Ins.
Co., 301 N.Y. 403, 94 N.E. 2d 73 (1950).
The status of the mortgagee of real property under a policy of fire insurance
effected by the mortgagor presents a problem that has continually vexed the courts
of the several states. While both the mortgagor and the mortgagee have separate
insurable interests in the property, and each may protect himself from loss by his
own policy of insurance, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the
mortgagee has no interest in the proceeds of a policy owned by the mortgagor.1
Consequently, most mortgages contain a provision or clause that the mortgagor is to
insure the premises to the extent of the mortgage debt for the benefit of the mortgagee.
A former method of providing the mortgagee this protection was the insertion of a
"loss payable" clause2 in an existing policy or including it in one subsequently taken
out by the mortgagor. Under such a policy the loss, if any, was made payable to
the mortgagee as his interest might appear. However, in 1858 the former doctrine
that such a clause protected the mortgagee from any default on the part of the
mortgagor was overruled by the case of Grosvenor v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co.8 That
case held that where a fire insurance policy named the owner of the premises as the
party insured, followed by a loss payable clause, the mortgagee's right of recovery
on the policy was barred by a breach of the conditions of the policy by the owner-
mortgagor. The rule of the GrosvenoP case was widely followed with the result that
mortgagees were forced to take out their own policies of insurance as to their mortgage
interests. This added expense led eventually to the adoption of a special clause in
the policy known as the "standard mortgagee" clause.
The standard mortgagee clause provides that the loss, if any, under the policy in
which the owner-mortgagor is the named insured, shall be payable to the mortgagee
as his interest may appear, and further, that no act or neglect of the owner or
mortgagor shall invalidate the insurance as to the interest of the mortgagee. Accord-
ing to the New York and the majority view as enunciated in the case of Hastings v.
Westchester Fire Insurance Co.,4 this clause creates a separate and independent con-
1. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Penn Plate Glass Co., 186 U.S. 434 (1902).
2. This clause merely states that the loss, if any, is payable to the mortgagee as his
interest may appear. It is sometimes called an "open mortgage" clause. See RieiRws, LAw
oF INsURANcE § 277 (4th ed. 1932).
3. 17 N.Y. 391 (1858).
4. 73 N.Y. 141 (1878).
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tract of insurance between the mortgagee and the insurance company. However, in
accepting and following the independent contract theory, the courts apparently have
been motivated more by a desire to protect the mortgagee, than by strict adherence
to the rules of contract law.5 Thus the independent contract theory has been upheld
even in cases where the mortgagee had no knowledge of the policy until after the
loss occurred. 6 While there is a minority view that the standard mortgagee clause
merely creates a third-party beneficiary contract in favor of the mortgagee,7 the
New York courts have consistently followed the independent contract theory. In
keeping with this theory, the courts have held that recovery by the mortgagee is
not barred by the mortgagor's failure to file proof of loss,8 nor by the mortgagors
breach of warranty of ownership and occupancy,0 nor by any admissions of the
mortgagor made after the fire.' o It has also been held that the mortgagee is a
necessary party to any suit brought by the mortgagor against the insurance company
to recover for fire loss," and that a settlement between the owner and insurer is not
binding upon the mortgagee.' 2
Thus, the court in the principal case reasoned that it necessarily followed that "a
mortgagee in his own right is entitled as a principal to participate in any appraisal
proceedings which will actually determine the amount due him by reason of the
mortgage."' 3 The majority felt that the phrase "any act or neglect" in the mortgage
clause was broad enough to extend to the appraisal provisions of the policy. 4
The majority of the court ignored the fact that the appraisal was conducted in
good faith, and the rule laid down by the case makes no distinction between appraisals
conducted in good faith and those which are tainted with bad faith, collusion or fraud.
Concededly, the latter type of appraisal would not be binding on the mortgagee.
The dissenting judges based their opposition on the language of the appraisal clause
in the policy itself. Pointing out that the word "insured" in the appraisal clause
5. The independent contract theory completely overlooks the necessity of offer, accept-
ance and consideration to make a binding contract. The provision for subrogation is no
more than a condition and is not valid consideration, nor is the condition that the mort-
gagee shall pay premiums in case of the mortgagors default. The contention that the
mortgagor is the agent of the mortgagee is clearly unsound, since there is nowhere to be
found any intention to create such a relationshp.
6. See Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Atlas Assurance Co., 188 N.C. 744, 753, 125
S.E. 631, 634 (1924).
7. Walker v. Queen Ins. Co., 136 S.C. 144, 134 S. E. 263 (1926), is the leading case
advocating this minority view. In that case Cothran, J. stated: "The contract of insurance
was therefore for the mutual benefit of both mortgagor and mortgagee, and in no sese
a contract between the mortgagee and the insurance company; the mortgagee being simply
a third party who, by the contract between the mortgagor and the insurance company,
acquired a beneficial interest in the policy, really an additional security to the bond and
note secured by the mortgage." Id. at 162, 134 S. E. at 269. See WXLLXSnm:-, CozzmArTs
§ 401A (rev. ed. 1936) in which the language of the Walher case is quoted with approval,
and also the note in 33 CoL. L. REv. 305 (1933).
8. McDowell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 207 N.Y. 482, 101 N.E. 4S7 (1913).
9. Goldstein v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 256 N.Y. 26, 175 N.E. 359 (1931).
10. Browning v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N.Y 503 (1877)
11. Lewis v. Guardian Fire & Life Assur. Co., 181 N. Y. 392, 74 N. E. 224 (190S).
12. Hathaway v. Orient Ins. Co, 134 N.Y. 409, 32 N.E. 40 (1892).
13. 301 N.Y. 403, 408, 94 N.E.2d 73, 76 (1950).
14. Id. at 409, 94 N. E. 2d at 76.
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referred to the owner-mortgagor only, the dissent argued that by following the
appraisal provisions of the policy in good faith the owner was not invalidating the
mortgagee's rights, but, on the contrary, was actually asserting those rights.15 It
was further pointed out by the minority of the court that stretching the appraisal
clause to let in a third appraiser to represent the mortgagee would do violence to
the plan of appraisal set up by the policy. 16
It is submitted that the element of good faith on the part of the mortgagor is of
extreme' importance and should not be overlooked, especially when the language of
the appraisal clause makes no mention at all of the mortgagee. Indeed, the only
time the mortgagee is mentioned in connection with the appraisal clause in the policy
is in that section of the policy dealing with "mortgagee interests and obligations."
Therein it is expressly stated that in case the insured fails to file proof of loss, the
mortgagee shall and that upon filing such proof, the mortgagee rather than the insured
is subject to the appraisal provisions of the policy.17 Thus it would seem that if the
mortgagee were to participate in the appraisal, even when the mortgagor has filed
proof of loss, express provision to that effect would also be included in the policy.
Moreover, it is difficult to see how by pursuing the express language of the policy
in regard to appraisal, the mortgagor is doing an "act" of the type referred to in
the standard mortgagee clause which will not invalidate the policy as regards the
mortgagee. Those "acts or neglects" would seem to be acts outside the provisions of
the policy itself, or neglects of provisions contained therein. In the instant case the
mortgagor was performing an act within the provisions of the policy in good faith.
Since the theory of an independent contract is little more than a legal fiction
invented to afford clear-cut protection for the mortgagee, it should not be unnecessarily
extended in a case such as this, where the mortgagor has proceeded in absolute good
faith under the express provisions of the policy.
TORTS-RIGHT op PRIVAcY-FACTUAL PRESENTATION IN A COMIC BOOK OF A
MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST.-Plaintiff, a Pharmacist's mate in the United States
Coast Guard, was a celebrated hero of the disaster which occurred when an Army
bombing plane crashed into the Empire State Building in July, 1945, maiming and
and killing many occupants. Because of his quick action in procuring medical
equipment and administering first aid, plaintiff was awarded the Medal of Valor and
was featured in daily journals and newsreel motion pictures throughout the country.
Some six months later an account of plaintiff's exploits, based on news reports but
containing some minor errors, appeared in the form of a series of drawings in a
publication entitled "Boy Comics." Plaintiff sued for infringement of his right of
privacy under Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law alleging that
15. Id. at 415, 94 N. E. 2d at 80.
16. Id. at 416, 94 N. E. 2d at 81. Under the majority holding it is not at all clear how
the insurance company is to overcome the obvious disadvantage which would result if It is
to be limited to naming one appraiser, while the mortgagor and mortgagee each name one.
This resulting dilemma calls for either judicial clarification or legislative redrafting of the
appraisal provisions of the policy.
17. Lines 74-8 of the 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy read as follows:
"If the insured fails to render proof of loss such mortgagee, 'upon notice, shall render proof
of loss in the form herein specified within sixty (60) days thereafter and shall be subject
to the provisions hereof relating to appraisal and time of payment and of bringing suit."
(Italics added.)
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as a result of this publication there was a threat of court martial and discipline and
that after leaving service he was refused a job because he had become a "comic book
character." On appeal from a verdict in favor of plaintiff, held, two justices dis-
senting, judgment reversed on the groubd that the name and likeness of plaintiff
were not used for advertising or trade purposes since the publication was a factual
version of a legitimate news item and was in no way fictionalized. Molony v. Boy
Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 119 (lst Dep't 1950).
The right of privacy which plaintiff sought to vindicate has been defined as "the
right to be let alone; the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity."'
In New York a qualified right of privacy is recognized by statute. Section 50 of the
Civil Rights Law provides: "A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertissing
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor
of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 51 provides for
the recovery of damages.2 A concise classification of applicable rules as to whether
or not the statute has been violated by newspaper articles was set forth in Labiri v.
Daily Mirror, Ix. 3 by justice Shientag who concurred in the majority opinion in the
principal case.
It was held by the majority of the court in the instant case that the plaintiff's
rights under the statute had not been violated because the publication in question
was a factual presentation of a matter of legitimate public interest. This conclusion
was arrived at after a considered application of the rules, formulated by Justice
Shientag, applicable to unauthorized publications in a single issue of a newspaper.
The fact that the article was presented pictorially in the form of sketches through
the medium of a comic book and that it appeared among a series of fictionalized
items was not sufficient to preclude the finding that it was a publication of a factual
nature. The errors in the sketches and descriptions of plaintiff's actions were not
deemed essential enough to destroy the accuracy of defendant's presentation. The
principal question considered and then answered in the negative by the majority
holding was whether "the defendant has embroidered this event by fiction, with the
1. Pavesich v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. l0, 50 S.E. 6S (190S).
2. N.Y. Laws of 1919 c. 14, -amended by N.Y. Laws of 1911 c. 226 and N.Y. Laws
of 1921 c. 501.
3. 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Justice Shientag summarized
the rules applicable to unauthorized publications of photographs in a single issue of a
newspaper as follows: The statute is violated if a photograph of plaintiff is published in
or as part of an advertisement or for advertising purposes and also if the photograph is
used in connection with an article of fiction in any part of a newspaper. The statute
is not violated by mere publication of a photograph in connection with an article of
current news or immediate public interest, whether it appears in the news columns, the
educational or the magazine sections, since it is the article itself rather than its location
that is the determining factor. justice Shientag considering instances where the issue would
not be so dearly obvious said, "Newspapers publish articles which are neither strictly
news items nor strictly fictional in character. They are not the responses to an event of
peculiarly immediate interest, but, though based on fact, are used to satisfy an ever-
present educational need. Such articles include, among others, travel stories, stories of
distant places, tales of historic personages and events, the reproduction of items of past
news and surveys of social conditions. These are articles educational and informative in
character. As a general rule, such cases are not within the purview of the statute." Id. at 782,
295 N.Y. Supp. at 388.
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consequence that it is neither an article of current news, educational in character, nor
a subject of legitimate public interest. ' 4
The fact or fiction test, which is the basis of the holding of the majority opinion
has a background of judicial decision. This criterion had its foundation in the case
of Binns v. The Vitagraph Company of America.5 The court in that case did not
make the distinction between fact and fiction in express language, but intimated that
such was its reasoning by its finding for the plaintiff because of the exaggeration and
misrepresentation present in a motion picture depicting events in which the plaintiff
was involved. The doctrine of the Binns case was formulated in definite wording in
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.6 and made the basis of the decision in Sidis v.
F-R Publishing Corp.1 and Kreiger v. Popular Publications, Inc.8 Although this is an
accepted test which has been the sole deciding factor in numerous cases and is the
underlying principle of Justice Shientag's classification, it is submitted that there are
additional factors in the instant case, not present in former controversies, which
should have been afforded recognition by the court.
The question to be decided before the fact or fiction test can be applied is neces-
sarily-is the publication a matter of news interest to the general public? A determi-
nation of this problem requires a careful balancing between the public's right to the
truthful presentation of matters of an educational and informative nature to which
their interests are attracted and the conflicting interest of the individual's desire to
withdraw from the public eye.0 Those who have voluntarily exposed themselves to
public view1o as well as those who have involuntarily become participants in matters
of general interest 1' can be said to have lost their right of privacy. This rule is,
nevertheless, subject to the restriction that matters which would shock the com-
munity's sense of decency should not be held to be privileged merely because the
4. 277 App. Div. 166, 170, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (1st Dep't 1950).
5. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
6. 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919). "It [the Binns case] was
held to be pure fiction and not fact and as such it was held to be within the act and
the exhibition of that film was enjoined." Id. at 475, 178 N.Y. Supp. at 758.
7. 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). ". . .it is clear that 'for the purposes of trade' does
not contemplate the publication of a newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful
news or other factual information to the public. Though a publisher sells a commodity
and expects to profit from the sale of his product, he is immune from the interdict of
§§ 50 and 51 so long as he confines himself to the unembroidered dissemination of facts.
Publishers and motion picture producers have occasionally been held to transgress the
statute in New York but in each case the factual presentation was embellished by some
degree of fictionalization." Id. at 810.
8. 167 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y. S. 2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1938). "In the present case there is nothing
indicated that the story attacked 'describes a current event or is of such general news
interest or imparts such information as to come within the allowable area of the statute.
On the contrary, it may be reasonably inferred from the complaint that it is fiction. As
such, it would come within that class of cases in which a recovery may be had." Id. at 8,
3 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
9. See Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MicE. L. REv. 526, 560 (1914).
10. Koussevitsky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc.. et al., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S. 2d
779, aff'd mem., 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y. S. 2d 432 (1st Dep't 1947); Ruth v. Educa-
tional Flms, Inc., 194 App. Div. 893, 184 N.Y. Supp. 948 (1st Dep't 1920).
11. Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., 237 App. Div. 863, 260 N.Y. Supp. 972
(3d Dep't 1932), reversing, 139 Misc. 290, 248 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
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public might be expected to express a morbid curiosity in them.12 Concededly in
the instant case the plaintiff, although perhaps involuntarily, had become a public
figure and the publication can in no sense be characterized as one which would outrage
common decencies. However, there is another factor to be considered in regard to
the plaintiff's status as a personage of legitimate public interest-namely-at what
point do past events lose their privilege as news? In Mat v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc.
et aL'5 a re-enactment, through the medium of a radio production, of a holdup and
shooting of which plaintiff was the victim and which had taken place over a year
before was held to be no longer privileged as a news account. On the other hand, in
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,1 4 the publication of a biographical sketch of a man
who 25 years previously had been a famous child prodigy was held to be a matter
of legitimate public interest. However, in that case there is the distinguishing factor
that the article described the present condition and habitude of the plaintiff, that of
a boy genius reduced to a mediocre and somewhat eccentric middle aged man, whereas,
both Mau v. Rio Grand Oil, Inc. et al., and the instant case are concerned purely
with past events. If the account of plaintiff's exploits had been incorporated into a
March of Time movie, a newspaper or magazine survey of the year's historic news
events, there would undoubtedly be no question but that it was an integral part of
a legitimate presentation to the public. Here, however, the facts do not seem to lead
to such an inevitable conclusion where plaintiff's name and an account of his actions
were selected from a mass of news stories and six months later published in a comic
book, not among other news items but interposed between highly fictionalized,
unrelated articles.
The majority opinion expressly refuted the holding of the lower court 5 that the
use of a comic book as a medium of publication could be a determinative element
in showing a violation of the statute. It is true that Justice Shientag's analysis of
the subject, upon which the majority holding based their reasoning, contended that
the location of the article is unimportant. His condensation of the applicable rules,
however, concerned unauthorized publications appearing in a single issue of a news-
paper. It is submitted that a comic book should not have been placed in the same
category as a newspaper until a few distinctions had been noted. Newspapers,' G maga-
12. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc. et al., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N.Y. 1939);
Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dep't 1920). See also
Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1st Dep't
1932), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933), and Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc.,
170 Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938). The former case, concerning a
non-fictionalized newsreel, is difficult to reconcile with cases applying the fact or fiction
test unless it is on the basis of the humilating character of the depiction of the plaintiff.
13. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
14. 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
15. 188 Misc. 450, 65 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1946). "A book of comic cartoons,
distributed for profit, even though the cartoons relate to a current event of some public
interest, is to be differentiated from newspaper and magazine articles of an educational
nature." Id. at 451, 65 N.Y. S. 2d at 173.
16. Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N.Y. Supp. 999
(2d Dep't 1914); Jeffries v. N.Y. Evening journal Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y.
Supp. 780 (Sup. CL 1910); Moser v. Press Publishing Co., 59 Misc. 78, 109 N.Y. Supp.
963 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
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zines, 17 motion pictures18 and radio programs' have been held to be proper and
normal channels for the dissemination of news and are so considered by the public.
A comic book is not usually associated in the mind of the public as a medium for
news dispersal. In Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp.2° the use of plaintiff's
name and photograph was held to be a violation of Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil
Rights Law where the medium of publication was the program of a six day bicycle
race; the court saying that "there exists too wide a difference between a daily news-
paper and an official program of a sporting event ...-21 to invoke the rule that an
item of legitimate public interest is immune from the interdict of the statute. In
Colyer v. Fox PubliShing Co.,22 however, the "Police Gazette" was found to be an
informative periodical and therefore not within the purview of the statute, despite
the court's statement that it was "an ornament of village barber shops." 2a But the
particular medium in that case did contain news items, although chiefly of sporting
events, whereas the informational characteristics of a comic book are practically non-
existent. That comic books may be considered by the public as substandard or
distasteful mediums is attested by recent iews stories.
24
The minority opinion in the instant case advocated a test looking to the purpose
of the publication and held that "where the prime motive of the publication is amuse-
ment, as a matter of law, the purpose is commercial." 25 That such a criterion is not
always practical is evident when it is realized that many publications, constituting
news items of genuine interest, might be held to be an invasion of privacy since
written in a light, humorous style. Again the almost insurmountable difficulty of
determining whether an article looks to amuse or to educate its readers diminishes the
practicability of this test. The minority holding, however, in considering the question
of the medium of publication employed by the defendant seems to have reached a
more logical conclusion. It found that a comic book was not a means of disseminating
news and therefore not exempt from the statute.
2 6
It is submitted that while the majority holding in the instant case is correct in
its finding that the publication constituted a factual presentation of plaintiff's deeds,
there may be reason to doubt that there should be a privilege to continue the
plaintiff's news value six months after the event in a medium not a normal channel
for the dissemination of news. In any event it would seem that the damage suffered
by the plaintiff would be very slight, if any, since the publication merely further
honors his brave exploits.
17. Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., 234 App. Div. 904, 261 N.Y. Supp. 972
(3d Dep't 1932), reversing, 139 Misc. 290, 248 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
18. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
19. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F. 2d 467 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
20. 176 Misc. 714, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
21. Id. at 716, 28 N.Y. S. 2d at 813.
22. 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N.Y. Supp. 999 (2d Dep't 1914).
23. Id. at 299, 146 N.Y. Supp. at 1000.
24. For conflicting views as to the worth of and value to be attributed to comic books,
see N.Y. Tnes, Nov. 13, 1950, p. 1, col. 2 and N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 14, 1950,
p. 25, col. 4.
25. 277 App. Div. 166, 174, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119, 126 (1st Dep't 1950).
26. "The comic book with which we are concerned is not dedicated to reporting true
stories of current events. The book contained the legend 'No actual person is named or
delineated.' It is not set up as a medium of disseminating news. That claim is not sup.
ported by the publication." Ibid.
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TRUSTS-ToITEN TRUsT-ILLusoRY TRAxSFER SUBorDINATE Tro STATUTORY SHARE
or SuRvxVG Spous.-Prior to their separation the testator devised all of his
property to his wife. After the separation, he opened four savings bank accounts in
trust for his grandchild. The testator retained possession of the passbooks but did
not disaffirm or revoke the trusts in his lifetime. A proceeding was brought by the
wife to have the Totten trusts turned over to her as part of the testators estate. The
Surrogate held that the Totten trusts were illusory transfers, that their proceeds
belonged entirely to testator's estate and passed wholly to his widov.. On appeal,
held , judgment reversed. The Totten trust is illusory only in so far as it deprives
the surviving spouse of her statutory share under Sections 18 and 83 of the Decedent
Estate Law. The remainder of the trust is valid. Application of Halpern, 277 App.
Div. 525, 100 N.Y. S. 2d 894 (1st Dep't 1950).
The judicial birth of the Totten trust1 occurred many years prior to the right of
election given to a surviving spouse by Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law. -
Hence the question in the instant case whether, as a matter of law, a Totten trust
is illusory and an invalid invasion of the expectant interest of a surviving spouse,
could not arise until the enactment of the statute.
The rights created by the Decedent Estate Law in lieu of dower were intended to
enlarge rather than restrict the rights of a wife in the property of her husband.a
But in one of the earlier cases 4 when the surviving spouse, as administratrix, con-
tended that Section 18 revoked the Totten trust, and attempted to have it turned
over to the estate, the court held that Section 18 did not affect directly or by impli-
cation the disposition of property by Totten trusts.5 In Matter of Reich,0 Totten
trusts were held to be a legally authorized manner of disposing of property "in degree
equal to a will."7 This view was later clarified and the Totten trust protected from
attack by virtue of Section 18 by In re Schurer's Estate.8 In that case, a surviving
spouse, electing to take against the will, contended that the beneficiaries of the trust
took subject to her right of election and that the funds must be included in the
testator's estate. The court held that the proceeds of a Totten trust were not part
of the decedent's estate for the purpose of calculating the widow's share when she
exercised her right of election.
1. Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) which declared that a bank
deposit in trust for another established merely a tentative trust, revocable at will, until
the depositor died or completed the gift in some unequivocal manner.
2. Section 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law became effective September 1,
1930, whereas savings bank trusts existed a quarter of a century prior to Matter of Totten.
3. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). "The Legislature has
declared that its intention in enacting these sections of the revised Decedent Estate Law
was to increase the share of a surviving spouse in the estate of a deceased spouse, either
in a case of intestacy or by an election against the terms of the will of the deceased
spouse thus enlarging property rights of such surviving spouses. (Laws of 1929, chap. 229,
§ 20)" Id. at 375, 9 N. E. 2d at 967. •
4. Matter of Yarme's Estate, 148 A1isc. 457, 266 N.Y. Supp. 83 (Surf. Ct. 1933), aff'd
2nen., 242 App. Div. 693, 273 N.Y. Supp. 403 (2d Dep't 1934).
5. Id. at 459, 266 N.Y. Supp. at 95.
6. 146 Misc. 616, 618, 262 N.Y. Supp. 623, 626 (Surr. Ct 1933).
7. Id. at 618, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 623.
8. 157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. CL 1935), aff'd nem., 243 App. Div. 697,
289 N.Y. Supp. 818 (Ist Dep't 1936).
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In Newman v. Dore,9 which involved an intervivos non-Totten trust, the court
laid down the rule for determining whether reserving the entire income during the
settlor's life with a broad power of revocation was an unlawful invasion of the ex-
pectant interest of the surviving spouse. As stated by the court, "the only sound test
of the validity of a challenged transfer is whether it is real or illusory . . . . the test
applied is essentially . . . whether the husband has in good faith divested himself of
ownership of the property or made an illusory transfer."'1 The good faith requirement
was held not to refer to the purpose of affecting the wife's expectancy but to the
intent of divesting himself of the ownership of the property, If the trust "takes
back practically all that it gives" or "is intended only as a mask for the effective
retention by the settlor of the property" the trust will be held to be illusory.12
In Krause v. Krause'8 the testator established a Totten trust for his daughter but
retained possession of the passbook during his lifetime, neither completing nor revok-
ing the trust. The surviving spouse attacked the trust as an unlawful invasion of
her expectant interest under Section 18. There was no evidence of the purpose of
the transfer, i.e., whether real or illusory, except the very facts which constituted it
a Totten rather than an ordinary trust. Applying the rule of the Newman case to a
Totten trust, the court reinstated the trial court's finding that it was an illusory
transfer but expressly left open the disposition of the funds in the account until the
will was probated.' 4
The court in the instant case answered the question left open in the Krause case
and held that a Totten trust is an illusory transfer in part and a valid transfer of
the remainder to the named beneficiary.',
It is submitted that the result reached in the instant case is inconsistent with the
strict theory of Totten trusts. A Totten trust, though revocable during the depositor's
lifetime, is presumed to be an absolute trust upon the death of the depositor in the
absence of a disaffirmance or revocation. Thus the funds should pass directly to the
beneficiary and never become part of the decedent's estate.'( By the very wording
of Section 18, the expectancy of the surviving spouse is contingent upon the property
9. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
10. Id. at 379, 9 N.E. 2d at 969 (italics supplied).
11. Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 259, 112 Atl. 62, 63 (1920).
12. 275 N.Y. 371, 381, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 969 (1937).
13. 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. 2d 769 (1941).
14. "The ultimate conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff had a one-third Interest
in this bank account was not called for. Any determination of the extent of the plaintiff's
interest in the estate . . . should have awaited probate of his will." Id. at 33, 32 N.E. 2d
at 781.
15. Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, 86 N.Y. S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949), reached the
same result as in the instant case.
16. In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. Ct. 1935). In
Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y. S. 2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939),
the court denied the surviving spouse a right of election against certain Totten trusts where
the husband died intestate upon the ground that § 18 was intended to apply only when
the deceased had attempted by a will to deprive the spouse of his or her statutory share.
The soundness of this case has been questioned in later decisions. Hirschfield v. Ralston,
66 N.Y. S. 2d 59, 61 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Marano v. LoCarro, 62 N.Y. S. 2d 121, 125 (Surr.
Ct. 1946); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenherg, 176 Misc. 312, 314, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 270, 272
(Surr. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 234, 236, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 841, 843 (2d Dep't 1941).
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becoming part of the decedent's estate.7 If the decedent effectively and absolutely
conveys away the property during his lifetime, the expectancy does not ripen into a
property right.
A Totten trust is not a testamentary disposition within the meaning of Section 21
of the Decedent Estate Law.'8 It is true that for certain limited purposes10 the
courts have treated it as testamentary in character. In Matter of Rcich,20 the court
held that the burial expenses of the depositor were a proper charge against the savings
bank trust account. The result was reached on the theory that the presumption of
an absolute trust may be rebutted by a strong inference of fact or competent evidence.
The inference relied upon by the court was the natural desire of the testator to have
a decent burial and was deemed to override the presumption of an absolute trust.
Another instance of a permissive invasion of a Totten trust arose in the case of
creditors of the depositor.2' Until his death, the depositor had absolute control of
the accounts, and it was his duty to apply the funds in satisfaction of his obligations
to creditors. A failure to do so would have amounted to a fraud upon creditors which
a court would not enforce in favor of a volunteer. A third instance in which a savings
bank trust has been invaded was for the purpose of imposing a tax upon the transfer
of property.22 No difficulty is presented in this situation because the language of
the statute imposing tax liability is sufficiently broad to include Totten trusts.
17. N.Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 18: ". . . a personal right of election is given to the
surviving spouse to take his or her share of the estate as in intestacy .... "
In Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y. S. 2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941),
although the will was made prior to the effective date of § 18, the court held that, while
the widow had no right of election under § 18, she may rely upon it to set aside a revocable
trust (not a Totten trust) as illusory "where the very purpose of the decedent in so
conveying was to avoid its application." Id. at 237, 28 N. Y. S. 2d at 844. In Bums v.
Turnbull, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945), the surviving spouse of an intestate
alleged that a trust, which was not a Totten trust, was illusory and that it was made to
defeat his rights, as surviving spouse, under §§ 18 and 83 of the Decedent Estate Law. In
a memorandum opinion, the court affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Division declaring
the trust illusory. 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943).
18 Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933). "It amounts
to a judicial addition to the mode permitted by section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law
for the transmission of property on death." Id. a 618, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 626.
19. 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y. S.2d 894 (1st Dep't 1950). In the instant case the
court stated that "Our decision in this case is limited to holding that where a Totten trust
is involved, a decedent's estate is to be administered in such manner that the surviving
spouse receives what he or she would have been guaranteed by sections 18 and 83 of the
Decedent Estate Law if the Totten trust accounts had belonged entirely to the decedent
at the time of his death, but without increasing his or her share beyond the amount thus
secured by statute, and without augmenting the shares of other beneficiaries or distributcesY
Id. at 530, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
20. 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. CL 1933). See also Matter of Greniewich,
243 App. Div.:811, 278 N.Y. Supp. 279 (2d Dep't 1935).
21. Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N.Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't 1903).
In Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937), the court followed
the Beakes case, but states that in the absence of such decision, §§ 274 and 275 of the
Debtor and Creditor Law would seem to require a like result.
22. N.Y. TAX LAw § 220 (5). Matter of Kiernan, 134 Misc. 868, 237 N.Y. Supp. 290
(Surr. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 227 App. Div. 782, 237 N.Y. Supp. 811 (1st Dep't 1929).
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In the instant case, however, there appear to be no facts to overcome the pre-
sumption of an absolute trust. Furthermore the fact that the Totten trusts were
created after the separation suggests an intention on the part of the testator to make a
trust absolute on his death and not one subject to invasion. The present decision can,
therefore, be viewed only as the result of the judicial inclination to seize upon the
hybrid nature of the Totten trust to subordinate it to rights elsewhere given by statute.
UNFAIR COMPETITION--"PALMING OFF" NOT ESSENTIAL-POWER TO ENJOIN
RECORDING OF OPERA PERFORANE.-The plaintiff, Metropolitan Opera Company
in December, 1946 sold the exclusive right to make and sell phonograph records of
its operatic performances and to use the name Metropolitan Orchestra and any
similar names identified with the plaintiff opera company in connection with these
phonograph records to the intervening plaintiff, Columbia Records, Inc., for a five
year period. The plaintiff opera company also sold the exclusive right to broadcast
its performances during the 1949-50 season to the plaintiff, American Broadcasting
Co. The defendants commenced to make recordings of the plaintiff's productions
from radio broadcasts without permission. These recordings were then sold and
advertised by the defendants to the public as records of the performances of the
Metropolitan Opera House. The plaintiffs thereupon brought this action for all in-
junction and for damages and an accounting. The defendants responded with a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Held, defend-
ants' motion denied on the ground that "palming off" is no longer essential in a suit
based on unfair competition; that plaintiffs do have a quasi property right which
will be protected by equity and that such has not been abandoned by its grant of
licensing privileges and subsequent broadcasts; that the requirement of actual com-
petition is not essential, but, in any event, is met in this case by the joinder of
parties plaintiff. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was granted. Metro-
politan Opera Ass'&n Inc. et al v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp. et al., 101 N. Y. S.
2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
One of the principal objections of the defendants was that it could not commit
the tort of unfair competition without "palming off," i.e., passing off its goods as those
of the plaintiff opera company. The court properly disposed of this objection since the
element of "palming off" has long since disappeared as a necessary element in the tort
of unfair competition.1 A misappropriation of the property of the plaintiff is certainly
as unconscionable as a misrepresentation that the defendant's goods are the plaintiff's.
A further argument of the defendants that there was no competition between the
parties was also properly answered inasmuch as one of the plaintiffs, the Columbia
Records, Inc., was certainly in direct competition. Moreover, aside from the identical
1. In the early stages of injunctive relief against unfair competition, it was necessary
in order for a plaintiff to have relief to show that the defendant was passing off his goods
to the public as those of the plaintiff. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed.
299 (2d Cir. 1917); Gotham Music Service, Inc., v. D. & H. Music Pub. Co.., 259 N.Y. 86,
181 N.E. 57 (1932); CLARK, EQurrv §231 (1937). However, the modern cases have
considered this element as immaterial so long as there has been an invasion by the de-
fendant of some property right in the plaintiff. International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). It was in this case that the court laid down the proposition
that injunctive relief may be had against a defendant who misappropriates (as distinguished
from misrepresents) what equitably belongs to the plaintiff. See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Old
Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 Fed. 600 (4th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 703 (1921).
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business of this plaintiff with that of the defendants, it would seem that even the
opera company and the radio broadcasting company might obtain an injunction despite
the fact that the two were not in identical competition with the defendants. The
modem tendency of the courts is to accentuate the element of unfairness rather than
competition.2
However, other arguments raised by the defendants are not so easily disposed of
and merit further discussion. Equity has generally refrained from affording a plaintiff
injunctive relief unless a property right has been injured In the case of an author
of a manuscript, play, poem, or book, the property right of the author is well
established.4 After a general publication, however, without taking advantage of the
copyright laws, literary property has been deemed abandoned and lost.5 Equitable
protection was afforded only up until the time of publication.
In the instant case the defendants argue that any property right which the plaintiffs
had was lost upon the broadcast to the public without protection of any copyright
statute. This factor makes the present case analogous to International News Service
v. Associated Press.6 In that case I.N.S. was restrained from pirating news gathered
by A.P. through the latter's own skill and expense. Specifically I.N.S. was enjoined
from copying news items posted on the bulletin boards of A.P. and printed in the
early editions of newspapers serviced by A.P. The Supreme Court, in justifying the
issuance of the injunction, declared that as between rival news agencies news was
"quasi property." 7 The Court stated that equity treats any civil right of a pecuniary
nature as a property right, that the right to acquire property by honest labor or the
conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard
property already acquired and furnishes the basis of jurisdiction in the ordinary case
of unfair competition. It was primarily upon this decision that the court in the
principal case based its opinion. In the I.N.S. case the subject matter of the litigation
was news. It is true that the Court stressed the fact that this news was gathered and
edited through the expense, labor and skill of A.P. and that in the instant case the
performance of the opera was produced through the skill, labor and expense of the
Metropolitan Opera Company. However, the performance of an opera, though the
Metropolitan Company may present it in a style superior to that of others, cannot
readily be likened to an item of news which has a unique value simply because it is
news. News has value when it is unknown to the general public. The Supreme Court
granted the injunction in the I.NS. case to prevent the piracy of the plaintiff's news
items at the time only when the news had any value as such.8 A clear distinction
thus was made between the time when the news was fresh and at the time when it was
conveyed to the public. In the instant case the plaintiffs assert the right to maintain
exclusively, for so long as they shall desire, the entire production of the various
operas from the point of presentation on the stage to the selling of records manu-
factured therefrom to the public.
There are many cases holding that the doctrine of the IN.S. case should not be
2. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
3. Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929).
4. 4 PoaROY, EQUrrY JUIsPaRDEcN § 1353 (5th ed. 1941).
5. Bzspim, PaRwcrPLs or EQurry § 455 (7th ed. 1907).
6. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
7. Id. at 236.
8. Id. at 240.
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extended beyond its own facts.9 Thus in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,10 the
plaintiff, which was a manufacturer of silk, created many new designs each year. It
was impossible to have such designs copyrighted or patented. The defendant admit-
tedly copied such designs and the plaintiff asked for an injunction to restrain defendant
company. The court denied the injunction and stated in reference to the I.N.S.
case that the language of the majority opinion in reference to news was not intended
to lay down a general doctrine or to create a sort of common law patent or copyright
for reasons of justice."' Again in 1940, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit 12 reiterated the proposition that the I.N.S. case was limited to its facts.
In the most recent case13 limiting the I.N.S. decision, the plaintiff was the owner of
a master recording the distribution rights of which were exclusively assigned. The
defendant, without plaintiff's permission appropriated to its own use the arrangement
and caused it to be reproduced on records and sold. The court refused an injunction
on the general ground that a sufficient property right was lacking in the plaintiff and
stated that the I.N.S. decision was not intended to apply to appropriations of a dif-
ferent character.
It may well be that the courts in these cases which limited the I.N.S. case to its
facts were influenced to a great extent by the dissent by Justice Brandeis in that case
in which he urged that in order for the courts to give relief in such cases, the proper
remedy would first have to be created by the legislature, viz., by amending the copy-
right laws to include the copyrighting of the plaintiff's labors.14 On the other hand,
the decision in the instant case is not alone in its interpretation of the LN.S. case as
a broad and general extension of the law. Some seventeen years after the ruling in
LN.S. Chief Justice Hughes declared that the rule in that case expanded the doctrine
of unfair competition to apply to any "misappropriation of what equitably belongs
to a competitor."15 One of the cases most closely in point is that of Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. et al. v. KQV Broadcasting Co.16 In that case the defendant, owner of
a radio station, placed observers at points near the athletic field of the plaintiff which
owned and managed a baseball team. The defendant's observers relayed play-by-
9. See Developments In The Law-Unfair Competition-1932, 46 HARv. L. Rav. 1171,
1174 (1933).
10. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
11. Id. at 280.
12. R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). The court
stated in reference to the I.N.S. case: "That much discussed decision really held no more
than that a western newspaper might not take advantage of the fact that it was published
some hours later than papers in the east, to copy the news which the plaintiff had collected
at its own expense. In spite of some general language it must be confined to that situ-
ation.... In the case at bar if Whiteman and RCA Manufacturing Company, Inc., cannot
bring themselves within the law of common-law copyright, there is nothing to justify
a priori any continuance of their control over the activities of the public to which they
have seen fit to dedicate the larger part of their contribution." Id. at 90. See also National
Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1936), where injunctive relief
was refused a plaintiff who asserted that it had the exclusive right to the play-by-play
description of a baseball game while in progress against a defendant which was disseminating
the news of the game obtained from the plaintiff's broadcasts.
13. Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
14. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918).
15. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935).
16. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938)
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play information of the game against the will of the plaintiff. In constructing a
property right in the plaintiff and in granting an injunction in pursuance thereof, the
court determined that the plaintiff had the right to control the news of the games
so long as they had any commercial value. An almost identical ruling was handed
down by a New York court 17 when ihe promoter of a boxing bout was declared to
have a property right in the news of entertainment value of the events being exhibited
under its auspices. In a number of other cases, decided both in the federal and state
courts, property rights have been found in plaintiffs ranging from the right to gather
market quotations to the right to create a distinctive style in the performance of a
well-known musical number.' 8 From a purview of these authorities, it would seem
that whether the expansion in the law of unfair competition which they have created
can be traced directly to the decision in the I.N.. case or not, clearly these courts
have not considered themselves bound to common law limits, but rather have expressed
the principle that he who reaps what he has not sown Will be enjoined. Indeed these
cases have led one writer to declare that whatever the law may have been before
the I.N.S. case, since that decision there has been imported into the law of unfair
competition the concept of unjust enrichment.'0
Moreover in this case a further factor is undoubtedly present which strengthens
the case of the plaintiffs. The public is being injured in presumably purchasing a
record -which purports to be a recording of a performance of the Metropolitan Opera
Company and actually is only a recording of a radio broadcast by that company.
The public is to that extent being fooled. While in the I.N.S. case the authentic news
was being purveyed by I.N.S. and presumably no alteration in the "product" resulted
from the piracy. The faithfulness of the reproduction here however would seemingly
be affected to some extent.
WmLs--IAcHEs AS A BAR TO PRoBAME.-Petitioner in 1950 sought to probate
her father's will executed in 1930. The father had died in 1941 and his will gave
the entire estate to the petitioner and cut off with $1.00 the respondent, his other
daughter. In order to avoid friction with the respondent, petitioner had sought
and obtained letters of administration, alleging that the decedent had left no will,
and a decree of judicial settlement was entered in 1944, but no receipts were filed
showing that the estate was distributed pursuant to the decree and no order obtained
discharging the petitioner as administratrix. Later the petitioner and respondent
disagreed and the petitioner filed the will for probate. Upon respondent's objection
that petitioner is precluded from bringing the proceeding by her prior acts and the
decree of the court, held, petition dismissed. In re Salkiewicz's Will, 100 N. Y. S.
2d 410 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
17. Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Service, Inc., 165 Misc.
71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. CL 1937). See also National Tel. News Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294 (7th Cir. 1902); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.
N.C. 1939) ; Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 25S App. Div. 459,
7 N.Y.S. 2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938). In all of these cases property rights were constructed
by the courts in a variety of fact situations.
18. See note 17 supra. See also Henry Glass & Co. v. Artmor Togs, Inc., 101 N. Y. S.
2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
19. Callman, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in Unfair
Competition, 55 HAav. L. REv. 595, 597 (1942).
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The court dismissed the petition because (1) it failed to allege grounds for
vacating the court's decree granting administration or sought such relief; (2) that
the petitioner had committed a fraud upon the court and was guilty of unclean
hands; and (3) that the petitioner was barred by laches.1 The discussion here will
be limited to the question of laches.
The policy of the state is to administer and settle decedents' estates as soon as
possible and once an estate is settled and property interests have vested, good cause
must be established to reopen the estate and revest the interests. 2 The Surrogates'
Courts in New York however, have power3 to open, vacate, modify or set aside any
decree or order for fraud4 in a like case and in the same manner as a court of
record or of general jurisdiction. A fraud can be perpetrated upon a beneficiary
under a will, a distributee or on the court itself.6 In the instant case a fraud was
clearly practiced upon the court.
Unreasonable delay in probating a will may exist without any fraud0 and, in the
absence of a specific statute of limitations,7 the mere passage of time does not
prevent the probate of a will.8 One of the usual reasons for such delayed probate
1. The court stated that the petition for letters of administration, under the assumed
facts, may be a renunciation of a legacy. 4 WARREN, HEkAToN ON SURROOATES' CouRTs § 406
f 10 (1940). But even if this were a fact, the will has to be probated in order for there
to be a legacy to renounce.
2. The court in Matter of Leslie's Estate stated: "It is not open to anyone, merely
by asserting a nebulous claim to an estate, to ask that a solemn decree admitting a will
to probate be vacated, and a long and expensive contest be entered upon. He must first
show with some degree of probability that his claim is well founded and that, If afforded
an opportunity, he will be able to substantiate it." 175 App. Div. 108, 112, 161 N. Y.
Supp. 790, 794 (1st Dep't 1916).
3. N. Y. SuR. CT. AcT § 20 (6). The exercise of a Surrogate's power to vacate a
decree for any grounds assigned in the section cited is not subject to any statutory limi-
tation. Matter of Henderson, 157 N. Y. 423, 52 N. E. 183 (1898); Matter of Flynn, 136
N. Y. 287, 32 N. E. 767 (1892).
4. This power to vacate has been limited by judicial decision to those cases where
fraud can be proved and it can be established that the claim for relief has a sound basis.
Matter of Elias, 222 App. Div. 728, 225 N. Y. Supp. 294 (1st Dep't 1927); Matter of
Leslie, 175 App. Div. 108, 161 N. Y. Supp. 790 (1st Dep't 1916); In re Kalmowltz's
Will, 135 Misc. 508, 236 N. Y. Supp. 223 (Surr. Ct. 1929); In re Jackson's Estate, 135
Misc. 750, 236 N. Y. Supp. 226 (Surr. Ct. 1928); In re Rowe's Estate, 134 Misc. 759, 236
N. Y. Supp. 229 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
5. Matter of Shonts, 229 N. Y. 374, 128 N. E. 225 (1920) ; Matter of Waters, 183 App.
Div. 840, 171 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1918).
6. 1 PAGE, WinXS §§ 532, 534 (2d ed. 1928); Haddock v. Boston & Me. R. R., 146
Mass. 155, 15 N. E. 495 (1888); Steadman et al. v. Steadman et al., 143 N. C. 345, 55
S. E. 784 (1906); In re Schell's Will, 272 App. Div. 210, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (3d Dep't
1947); In re Duffy's Will, 127 App. Div. 174, 111 N. Y. Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1908);
Weaver et al. v. Hughes, 26 Tenn. App. 436, 173 S. W. 2d 159 (1943); Howley et al.
v. Sweeney et al., 288 S. W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Hanley v. Kraftczyk, 119 Wis.
352, 96 N. W. 820 (1903).
7. Watson v. Turner et al, 89 Ala. 220, 8 So. 20 (1890) (5 year statute of limitations
on contests of probate).
8. See note 6 supra. But cf. In re Butler's Estate, 183 Minn. 591, 237 N. W. 592 (1931);
In re Schell's Willf 272 App. Div. 210, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (3d Dep't 1947).
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of a will is the sale of real property owned by the testatorP
Where, as in the principal case, the party seeking to probate a will has participated
in the fraud, there is a sharp split of authority. Some courts hold there is no limit on
the time to rectify a fraud on the court, the court refusing to recognize the fraud.'0
Other courts justify their refusal to probate a valid will after an undue delay,
coupled with a fraud upon the court, upon the ground that the final settlement of
decedents' estates is more to be desired than the probate of a true will.11 It is
submitted that these latter courts are in effect rewriting the testators last will and,
contrary to the established policy in respect to wills, depriving the decedent of the
right to dispose of his property as he desires. By appealing to laches, such courts
are not only punishing those who suppressed the 'will but are also frustrating the
testator's intent solely because of the fault of those named in the vill.
The instant case appears to be the first case in New York where probate has been
denied on the ground of laches. In one case involving the probate of a subsequent
will, which had been hidden during prior probate proceedings, the petitioner not
participating in the suppression, the court stated that there should be no time limit
on the right to petition to vacate a decree for fraud on the court, but found no
laches present.12 In another case, where a question was raised twenty years after
a will had been probated, whether the will had been duly executed, there was a
statement that a person could lose his rights to relief by laches, but this was a
dictum.13
The problem resolves itself into the question of whether, when a fraud has been
practiced on a court, the proper sanction is a denial of probate on the ground of
laches or estoppel, or indictment for perjury under the penal law.14 The acts of the
petitioner were obviously of a criminal nature and the criminal punishment for a
perjury should be an adequate sanction. To deny probate of the will is directly
in conflict with this state's established policy. It is barring a person from devising
his property as he desires. When a testator leaves a duly executed will, the court
should not permit the acts of the legatees to prohibit the carrying out of the ex.
pressed intention. The court stated that if an innocent party had been involved
relief would have been granted. The fact that the petitioner who committed the
fraud is the sole legatee should not effect the result. It would seem a sounder policy
for the Surrogate's Courts to allow the sanctions of the penal law remedy the wrong
committed by the petitioner and admit the will to probate.
9. Steadman et al. v. Steadman et al., 143 N. C. 345, 55 S. E. 784 (1905); In re Duffy's
Will, 127 App. Div. 174, 111 N. Y. Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1903); Hanley v. Kraftczyk, 119
Wis. 352, 96 N. W. 820 (1903). In one case where the will was probated to clear title,
.sixty-four years had elapsed since the death of the testator. Haddock v. Boston & Me. R.R.,
146 Mass. 155, 15 N. E. 495 (1888).
10. Watson v. Turner et a!., 89 Ala. 220, 8 So. 20 (1890); In re Klopstock's Estate, 31
Cal. App. 2d 568, 88 P. 2d 722 (1939); In re Culbertson's Estate, 301 Pa. 438, 152 Atl.
540 (1930); Alsobrook et al v. Orr et al., 130 Tenn. 120, 169 S. W. 1165 (1914); In re
Scheuren's Estate, 203 Wis. 69, 233 N. W. 622 (1930) ; cf. In re Cohen's Will, 190 Misc. 750,
75 N. Y. S. 2d 103 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
11. Allnutt et a!. v. Wood, 176 Ark. 537, 3 S. W. 2d 298 (1928); MUlligan et al. v.
Miligan, 145 Va. 184, 133 S. E. 672 (1926); Hayes v. Simmons et a., 136 Ola. 206, 277
Pac. 213 (1929); But see Bryan v. Seiffert, 94 P. 2d 526 (Okla. 1939).
12. In re Cohen's Will, 10 Misc. 750, 753, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 103, 107 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
13. In re Schell's Will, 272 App. Div. 210, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (3d Dep't 1947); In re
Duffy's Will, 127 App. Div. 174, 111 N. Y. Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1903).
14. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1620 (2).
